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The Legacy of German Idealism: The Unconscious 
 
Sebastian Gardner 
 
The conception of the unconscious with which we should be concerned, I will take it, is that of 
psychoanalysis. There are of course many ways of theorizing mental states which are not conscious 
– non-conscious representations are standard fare in modern cognitive psychology – but the 
psychoanalytic conception is the one which, over a century after its insertion into the epicentre of 
late modern intellectual life, continues to cast a spell and stir controversy; even those unpersuaded 
of the empirical truth of psychoanalytic claims and skeptical of its value as a therapeutic treatment, 
recognize in the idea of the unconscious expounded by Freud an intellectually fascinating object. 
The legacy question resolves itself accordingly into the question of the relation of psychoanalysis to 
classical German philosophy. However, as I will try to show, in pursuing this topic it is important to 
attend not only to those elements in the German philosophical heritage that survive into 
psychoanalysis but also to those which fell by the wayside. Adopting this historical perspective, I 
will suggest, allows us to understand a great deal concerning the philosophical and other problems 
of psychoanalysis, and in addition, the way in which psychoanalysis makes manifest the generally 
complex, ambivalent character of our present relation to the idealist legacy. 
 
I.  Kantian and Post-Kantian Origins 
 
1. Since our enquiry concerns the roots of the unconscious in German Idealism, it will be useful to 
begin with some brief reflections on this concept. 
 As already indicated, a distinction may be drawn between strong and weak conceptions of 
the unconscious, or as it may also be put, between the unconscious as such, and mere subliminality, 
preconsciousness, latent consciousness, sub-personal processing, etc.1 The notion of contents in the 
mind that are not present to awareness – and so which are nominally unconscious – occurs in many 
places in pre-Kantian philosophy and is consistent with all but the most severely Cartesian views of 
the mind. More is needed for a strong version of the concept of the unconscious, and several criteria 
suggest themselves. 
 (1) One standard way of drawing the distinction – which follows Freud's own distinction of 
Psc. from Ucs. – is in terms of avowability and accessability, i.e. the possibility of being made 
conscious: mental states are strongly unconscious if they cannot be rendered available for self-
                                                     
1 This is obviously not a strongly unified category – the mental states that ordinary psychology describes as failing to 
come to mind when bidden, as inaccessible due to self-deception, and so on, are very different from the theoretically 
postulated contents of sub-personal empirical psychology – but for present purposes it can be allowed to stand. 
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ascription by ordinary means, and if they are incapable of manifesting themselves in the interior of 
mental life in the distinctive and immediate way which characterizes the sorts of mental episodes, 
states and dispositions which are self-ascribed in ordinary, common sense psychology. 
 (2) Another involves distinguishing causally inert from causally efficacious unconscious 
elements: strongly unconscious mental contents are ones that are not merely parked inactively on 
the sidelines of the mind, like memory traces awaiting activation, but that can and do make a 
difference to mental life in the process of its conscious unfolding, without their becoming 
conscious. More strongly, it may be held that the causality of unconscious mental items is 
interdependent with their unconscious status, i.e., that their having the specific kinds of effects 
which they do presupposes their not being present to consciousness. All of this is involved in 
Freud's designation of Ucs. as 'dynamic'. 
 (3) A third criterion involves the idea of permanence of structure or systemic distinctness: 
the unconscious is conceived in strong terms when it is referred to as some sort of enduring, non-
episodic particular, capable of changing its specific contents over time and causally disposed to 
maintain itself in existence. In addition it may be held that the unconscious has its own distinctive 
nomology, that the laws of its operation are heterogeneous with those of the conscious (part of the) 
mind; Freud's conception of primary and secondary process, and of reality and pleasure principles, 
and the post-Freudian concept of phantasy. In this way, the property of unconsciousness ceases to 
be definable simply in terms of absence of consciousness and acquires a positive meaning, deriving 
from psychological theory. Thus Freud declared in his later metapsychology that the property of 
consciousness had lost its theoretical importance, and that the truly significant lines of mental 
division follow other axes. 
 (4) A strong conception of the unconscious will involve some claim of non-contingent 
causal dependence of conscious on unconscious mental functioning: though not necessarily a full-
fledged mental substance in its own right, the strongly conceived unconscious will occupy the role 
of 'substrate' with respect to at least some range of conscious mental states. 
 (5) It will be argued that contemporary theories of the mind as underpinned by modular 
information-processing structures meets the preceding conditions. One final condition is needed 
therefore, in order to distinguish the unconscious from what we would now call the properly sub-
personal. It is hard to formulate the idea which we need to introduce here in a way which is 
satisfactorily precise, but the basic thought is not hard to grasp: The states which compose the 
unconscious, however heterogeneous from my conscious states, must be ones which are not 
metaphysically remote from me in the way that the states of (say) my muscle fibres are, i.e., they 
must be states which I can identify with, the inaccessibility of which I can grasp as entailing some 
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sort of failure of self-knowledge. As Thomas Nagel puts it, they must fall within the bounds of 
'inner space'.2 
 (6) It is a consequence of the personal rather than sub-personal character of unconscious 
states that there is at least a loose analogy, in the distinction of the unconscious from the conscious 
mind, to the distinction of two agents.3 Whether or not a theory of the unconscious presses the 
interpersonal analogy to the point of explaining an individual's mental functioning on the model of 
two people conscious of their distinctness from, and bearing attitudes and intentions towards, one 
another, strong conceptions of the unconscious grant at least a toehold for the thought of the 
unconscious as the subject's 'Other'. 
 
2. To the extent that a conception satisfies these criteria, it approximates to what we find in Freud. 
Henceforth I will use the term unconscious in this sense. To what extent do we find such a proto-
psychoanalytic conception, or the roots thereof, in classical German philosophy? 
 The historical origins of psychoanalysis have been investigated intensively.4 The picture 
which emerges from the major studies is of a huge diversity of confluent historical sources, which 
do indeed include some philosophers from within the idealist tradition – Schelling, Romantic 
Naturphilosophen, Schopenhauer, Gustav Carus, Eduard von Hartmann – but which also 
encompasses numerous figures outside it, such as Hermann von Helmholtz and others in nineteenth-
century experimental psychology, along with a great number of natural and human scientists from 
other disciplines.5 If we restrict our attention to more local, biographical influences, the latter camp 
predominates overwhelmingly. Those who taught Freud or with whom he had professional 
associations in the early part of his career – Ernst Brücke, Josef Breuer, Theodor Meynert, Jean-
Martin Charcot, Wilhelm Fliess – were, like Freud, trained physicians whose conception of organic 
functioning had been thoroughly purged of 'vitalist' elements. Brentano provided Freud with direct 
exposure to philosophy, but stood opposed to the idealist orientation.6 Thus to the extent that we 
concentrate on Freud's proximate intellectual background, we will be led to regard psychoanalysis 
as a development, albeit somewhat exceptional, within the nineteenth-century German 
psychological tradition, unlikely to bear more than remote and accidental connections to idealist 
philosophy. 
                                                     
2 See Nagel 1969. 
3 The insight is elaborated in Davidson 1982. 
4 For a helpful synopsis, see Gödde 2010 and 2011. 
5 See Ellenberger 1970, Ch. 7, Sulloway 1979, and Kitcher 1992. 
6 See Freud's report of a discussion with Brentano in 1875, quoted in Gödde 2010: 266. Brentano's Psychology from an 
Empirical Standpoint (1874) contains a systematic critique, with reference to Hartmann, of the notion of unconscious 
mentality. 
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 The logical nature of psychoanalysis makes this, moreover, the most natural view to take. 
Psychoanalysis is an empirical discipline, a form of individual and social psychology little 
concerned with cognition and orientated instead towards the explanation of affective and conative 
phenomena, in particular those exhibiting an irrational character, a theory which exhibits 
furthermore pronounced naturalistic traits; on all counts, then, an utterly different creature from the 
systems of idealism. 
 But we are not obliged to leave matters at this point. One vital consideration that should 
incline us to a broader view of psychoanalysis' sources, and to consider seriously the possibility of a 
deep underlying connection with idealism, lies in Freud's own development. In his first attempt at a 
theory of the mind, the Entwurf einer Psychologie of 1895, Freud drew on exclusively materialist 
and mechanist concepts. In this work Freud developed a model of mental functioning based on the 
bare idea of flows of energy along neural pathways, the total quantity of energy being determined 
by external stimuli and motor discharge, and its distribution across the mental apparatus by 
variation in the capacities of different types of neuron to impede the transmission of energy.7 
Clearly, had Freud stuck with these austere theoretical resources, psychoanalysis would never have 
been born: its development presupposes, not necessarily abandonment of materialism in some form 
or other, but the admission of properties of a type not countenanced in the Entwurf.8 And this 
change in Freud's outlook cannot be regarded as a minor ontological relaxation. Once intentionality 
and unreduced mental content are allowed to be explanatory, the restrictive methodology 
appropriate to neural hypotheses has to be abandoned, and the entire history of philosophical 
reflection on the nature of the mind, and so of human subjectivity in its most general respects, 
assumes direct relevance. Freud's recognition that the discovery of the unconscious had transported 
him across an intellectual boundary and set him in the mainstream of humanistic Western thought, 
shows itself everywhere in his writings, and is not contradicted by his continued insistence on the 
scientificity of psychoanalysis. The question whether psychoanalytic theory draws from idealist 
sources is thereby thrown open. 
 It has been argued that, even before we come to Schopenhauer and the other salient figures 
of nineteenth-century thought, there is a deep connection of psychoanalysis with the original 
Kantian and post-Kantian transcendental project, and I think this claim is basically correct.9 The 
                                                     
7 The Entwurf treats 'psychical processes as quantitatively determinate states of specifiable material particles thus 
making these processes perspicuous and free from contradiction' (Freud 1895: 295). See Wollheim's summary, 1991, 
Ch. 1. Affirming that Freud's theory, though abandoned by him, was on exactly the right track, see Centonze et al. 
2004. 
8 It is implied by Ellenberger, 1970: 449, that the change in Freud's intellectual identifications, with Goethe taking the 
place of Brücke, Meynert, etc., can be dated to November 1897. 
9 Marquard's (1987) brilliant study, which deals with the topic in its entirety, deserves extended discussion, for which 
space does not allow. Since I have followed Marquard's account in broad outline, I should say briefly how my approach 
departs from his. On Marquard's account − in barest summary − transcendental philosophy undergoes a 
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connection of transcendentalism with psychoanalysis which I have in mind does not require us to 
deny, or even to play down, the points of contrast just indicated. In particular, it does not involve 
recasting psychoanalysis – as some schools of thought have done, Lacan's being the best known – 
as a philosophical theory of the subject masquerading as psychology.10 The weaker but nonetheless 
substantive suggestion which I shall defend is that there is a distinctive conceptual shape in the 
background of psychoanalysis, determining the contours of psychoanalytic theorizing about the 
mind, the original formulation of which is the work of post-Kantian idealists. Talk of conceptual 
shape is admittedly nebulous, but I will try to make it sufficiently definite for the claim to carry 
conviction.11 
 
3. We should first consider some of the ways in which it might be supposed that the historical roots 
of the concept of the unconscious go back to Kant himself.12 
 It has been suggested that Kant opens a door to the unconscious in consequence of the 
profound modification to the Cartesian view of the mind involved in Kant's theory of self-
knowledge, which tells us that awareness of what is in the mind is not immediate but involves 
supplementary conceptual operations; in other words, that mental contents are not conscious per se, 
in and of themselves, but need to be made conscious. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
'Depotenzierung': finding that it cannot make good on its claims for reason, it turns to Nature in search of a support, a 
strategy which can succeed only as long as an aesthetically grounded interpretation of nature can be sustained; and 
when this interpretation collapses, as modernity's progressive Entzauberung entails that it must, psychologism returns, 
in which movement psychoanalysis is born, reproducing in a different modality the original concepts of transcendental 
philosophy. The idea of a buried, strict logic to the historical development is of course extremely attractive, but it seems 
to me uncertain that a single intellectual current runs its course in the way that Marquard supposes. Neo-Kantianism 
seems to demonstrate the capacity of transcendentalism to survive the collapse of the aesthetically grounded view of 
nature. If on the other hand transcendentalism is identified with the original transcendental programme, then it must be 
regarded as simply extinguished, supplanted by an ascendant naturalism, making Marquard's strong claim for the 
identity of transcendental with psychoanalytic concepts hard to understand. My approach, developed in what follows, 
centres the connection of psychoanalysis with classical German philosophy on the subject's reflexivity, but does not 
construe psychoanalysis' appropriation of the concept of the unconscious forged in the context of idealism as the effect 
of a Depotenzierung of transcendental philosophy (however much it may presuppose it historically). As I see it, the 
concept of the unconscious is generated by idealism in consequence of attempts to follow through the transcendental 
programme beyond the point where Kant left it, but its reappearance in psychoanalysis is not connected with the 
philosophical problems of transcendentalism. In addition to Marquard, I have found Redding 1999, which traces 
connections of Freud with German Idealism concerning the idea of a 'logic of affect', while paying close attention to the 
shift from idealism to naturalism, extremely helpful. 
10 Although, as will become clear, on my view there is some truth in the approach which finds in psychoanalysis a 
'decentring of the subject', I do not think that it has the metaphysically subversive character which at least some French 
psychoanalytic theory ascribes to it: Freud is not positioned beyond and against the classical conception of the subject. 
11 Some writers imply that we need to proceed at a very high level of abstraction if we are to grasp the relevant 
connections. Foucault (1974: 326) is one influential example, identifying psychoanalysis with an entire shift of 
'episteme'. 
12 References to Kant appear in Freud – in particular, a comparison is drawn of the unconscious with Kant's thing in 
itself (Freud 1915: 171) – but as might have been expected in view of the prevalence of neo-Kantianism, Freud is 
chiefly interested in Kant qua epistemologist, in connection with the problem of how to warrantedly claim reality for 
unobservable entities. Situating Kant in relation to his predecessors on the topic of non-conscious ideas, see the editors' 
Introduction to Nicholls and Liebscher 2010. On Freud and Kant, see Pettigrew 1990, Brook 2003, and Tauber 2009. 
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 The importance of this point should not be exaggerated, however. Kant is more accurately 
described as concerned not with the relation of mental content to consciousness as such, but rather 
with the relation of objective mental content – cognition of objectivity – to self-consciousness, and 
in whatever way we interpret it, the main theses of Kant's Transcendental Deduction of the pure 
concepts of the understanding have no direct bearing on the existence or non-existence of the 
unconscious: even if Kant is required to grant the possibility, or even to affirm the actuality, of 
representations 'in' us which are nothing 'to' or 'for' us (A120),13 he is not committed to denying that 
those non-objective representations are accompanied by some species of consciousness, nor that 
they play a causal role in non-cognitive sectors of mental life.14 
 A closer approximation to the unconscious is provided, it may be suggested, by Kant's 
theory of synthesis, when this is read in transcendental-psychological rather than narrowly logical 
terms. Again, caution is required. Even if Kant's agencies and acts of synthesis are allowed to be 
hypostatized, it remains the case that non-conscious synthetic activity manifests itself directly in 
conscious mental life – necessarily so, since otherwise there could be no reason for positing its 
existence. There is consequently a good sense, vital to the epistemological purposes which drive the 
theory of synthesis, in which synthetic activity is implicitly present to consciousness, in a sense not 
terribly different from that in which the faculty of memory and acts of recall are implicitly present 
whenever something is remembered. The yield of the theory of synthesis as regards the concept of 
the unconscious is thus, at most, not much greater than what we find in Leibniz's doctrine of petites 
perceptions. To underline this point about the relative remoteness of synthetic activity from the 
concept of the unconscious, it may be observed that on several recent accounts the logical space 
occupied by Kant's theory of synthesis corresponds to that of cognitive psychology,15 an indication 
that (irrespective of whether we endorse the proposed naturalization) the theory lies closer to the 
properly sub-personal than it does to the unconscious.16 
 The third respect in which a hint, though again it is no more than that, of a conception of the 
unconscious may be detected in Kant lies in his claim concerning the necessary limit of self-
knowledge. Relevant here is not Kant's thesis of the unknowability of the noumenal self, the self as 
thing in itself, but the claim which it presupposes concerning the structure of self-consciousness: 
                                                     
13 Kant's Anthropology, §5 (1798: 23-26), discusses the 'immense' field of representations which we can be certain that 
we have, even though we are 'not conscious of them'. Kant classifies these, in rationalist language, as 'obscure' (dunkele) 
representations, and consigns them to 'physiological anthropology'. 
14 In this connection, see Prauss 2002. 
15 E.g., Kitcher 1994. 
16 Relevant here is C. C. E. Schmid's critique (noted in Frank 1997: 805, note 6) of the notion of 'bewußtseynslose 
Vorstellungen'; see Schmid 1791: 216-218, 281. Only components of representations, and other items that fall short of 
the logical nature of a representation (i.e. relation to an object), are allowed by Schmid to exist without consciousness. It 
is significant that Schmid offers an earlier version of the psychologistic interpretation of Kant advanced later by Fries, 
which I cite below as an example of non-idealist Kantianism in which the concept of the unconscious has no place, and 
that Schmid was later subjected to harsh criticism by Fichte. 
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namely, that it is impossible to know the self as thinking subject. Famously, Kant states in the 
Paralogisms that '[t]hrough this I or he or it (the thing) which thinks, nothing further is represented 
than a transcendental subject of the thoughts = X ... known only through the thoughts which are its 
predicates' (A346/B404). This claim derives from the fact that any attempt to cognize the self qua 
subject of thought 'can only revolve in a perpetual circle, since any judgment upon it has always 
already made use of its representation' (A346/B404); the self qua subject of thought is that 'through' 
which any object is cognized, and it is 'very evident that I cannot know as an object that which I 
must presuppose in order to know any object' (A402). What of course separates this denial of 
cognition of the transcendental subject from any positive conception of an unconscious is Kant's 
general thesis of the limitations of our knowledge, but the notion that self-consciousness contains a 
species of aporia – implied by Kant's affirmation of the necessity of the representation of oneself as 
'= X' – is plainly relevant. 
 The concept of the unconscious cannot, therefore, be ascribed a direct Kantian origin, even 
though we can detect in the contexts just described the seeds of, pointers to, relevant later 
developments. 
 
4. The situation changes, however, when we turn to the development of Kant's ideas about mental 
content and its conditions by his early contemporaries; these take us considerably closer to the 
dynamic unconscious. The first to be considered is Fichte.17 
 The Theoretical Part of the Wissenschaftslehre takes the place of Kant's theory of synthesis 
in giving an account of the preconditions of empirical consciousness in the form of a complex 
theory of mental acts. It amounts, however, to a very different kind of theory.18 The thickly multi-
layered, oppositional structure of Fichte's account of the absolute I's positing and counter-positing – 
in which elements are cross-related in horizontal structures, identified without reference to 
determinate types of representation, and form genetic series in which later forms displace their 
predecessors – is set at a vastly greater distance from the surface of conscious mental life than the 
synthetic structures postulated by Kant, meaning that there is no comparable sense in which Fichte's 
structures are implicitly present in consciousness: we cannot be thought to, as it were, see the I's 
positings in empirical consciousness, in the way that we can be thought to discern Kant's syntheses 
in the conceptually shaped sensible given. This is a direct consequence of Fichte's greater 
philosophical ambition: natural consciousness must be, Fichte thinks, not merely underwritten as 
regards its claims to knowledge, but allow its complete sufficient ground to be brought to light. 
                                                     
17 On Fichte and the unconscious, see the excellent study in Völmicke 2005, Ch. 3. 
18 The question of its ontological status, as with Kant's theory of synthesis, does not need to be decided here, and for 
present purposes we may again proceed on the basis of a realistic reading. 
 8 
Hence the greater depth of Fichtean transcendental grounds, and their consequent opacity from the 
standpoint of natural consciousness. 
 Among the important features distinguishing Fichte's theory from Kant's is the new role 
Fichte assigns to productive imagination, which extends the sense in which, for Fichte, 
transcendental grounds are screened off from empirical consciousness. In a way that recalls early 
modern rationalism, and that had enormous inspirational value for the German Romantics, Fichte 
introduces the idea that the transition to empirical consciousness, because it involves an abrupt 
discontinuity which has no conceptual solution, must be effected by imagination.19 Imagination, 
according to Fichte, is the faculty responsible for the conversion of purely rational structure into the 
kind of mental content that an empirical subject can recognize as its own. On Fichte's analysis, 
experience depends upon an interplay and 'clash' of opposed (finite and infinite) components, but 
this is possible, he argues, only if the 'boundary' between them is positively represented, and this is 
something which no purely intellectual function can do: mere thought can grasp them only as 
contradicting and so as cancelling one another. Productive imagination thus steps in, giving 
phenomenologically concrete, intuitable form to a structure which thought can grasp only as a 
relation of irreconcilable mutual exclusion; Fichte draws an analogy with the way in which instants 
of light and darkness can be given in experience as alternating only if the boundary between them is 
extended into a temporal instant.20 By relating to itself through the medium of imagination – which 
entails, in Fichte's full story, representing oneself in space and time – the I is able to grasp itself as 
distinct from its objects and to figure as an object for itself. 
 On Fichte's account, the contribution of productive imagination, along with all other aspects 
of the movement from absolute I-hood to empirical self-consciousness, covers its tracks: as Fichte 
never ceases to emphasize, the standpoints of life and philosophical reflection are distinct, and how 
things appear from the one is an inversion of the way in which they appear from the other.21 To the 
extent that the transcendental standpoint expresses itself in empirical self-consciousness, it does so 
only obliquely, in the form of moral consciousness: the genetic sequence which produces empirical 
self-consciousness also gives rise to the existence of the subject as a purposive practical being, the 
ultimate object of whose striving is the restoration of the full reflexivity of the absolute I: our 
vocation, represented in the terms of natural consciousness, is to fulfil the moral law, but expressed 
transcendentally, it is to achieve complete self-determination. Morality thus comprises, so to speak, 
unconscious knowledge of the absolute I. 
                                                     
19 Fichte 1794-95: 187-188, 193-194, 200-201. 
20 Fichte 1794-95: 187-208. 
21 Fichte 1794-95: 207-208. Natural reflection stops at the understanding, and if it were aware of the work of 
imagination, it would (mistakenly) consider empirical reality 'deception'. 
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 One way of understanding Fichte's alterations to Kant, helpful for present purposes, is to 
regard the Wissenschaftslehre's theory of the I's positings as reinterpreting, and eliminating, the 
aporia that Kant locates in self-consciousness: the subject of thought is indeed, as Kant says, not 
given objectually within empirical self-consciousness, but it is not thereby rendered unknowable; 
philosophical insight into the self-positing I is knowledge of the '= X' that Kant locates in self-
consciousness. 
 
5. Though for Fichte the transcendental grounds of ordinary mental life are invisible to the non-
philosophical subject, and the standpoints of life and of philosophy cannot be occupied 
simultaneously, the relation between them remains expressly rational in character and is open to full 
philosophical comprehension. This epistemologically optimistic claim is upheld, as we will see, in 
Schelling's earlier philosophy. 
 Not all post-Kantians affirmed this self-transparency, however. The supposition that, 
through the application of philosophical reason, it is possible to grasp the transcendental grounds of 
ordinary consciousness, as distinct from merely knowing that such grounds must exist, is 
challenged in different ways by Maimon and the early German Romantics. 
 Maimon denies that Kant's theory of cognition, or Reinhold's reworking of it, succeeds in its 
aim of establishing the necessary conformity of the sensible given to the conditions of the pure 
understanding: Kant's transcendental theory leaves a gap, according to Maimon, between the a 
priori and a posteriori elements of ordinary consciousness, which the Humean skeptic is free to 
exploit. The idealist epistemology to which Maimon is led through his criticisms of Kant's 
transcendental idealism postulates 'infinitesimals of sensation', differential elements of perceptual 
cognition akin to Leibniz's petites perceptions, which belong to the subject qua passive. The 
synthesis of these elements proceeds without consciousness, and the rules which govern it are not 
given to our understanding, whence the appearance of an a posteriori sensible given. Maimon's 
difference from Kant is therefore that, while Kant of course agrees that sensation represents a surd 
for our understanding, Maimon locates its ground within the subject, implying that the cognitive 
limitation which is constitutive of ordinary consciousness derives from a deficiency of self-
understanding. What is missing from the self-understanding of ordinary empirical consciousness 
nevertheless ought to be available to it, and this normative shortfall, grasped by the subject itself, 
drives it to seek to perfect itself. In a fully perfected and self-transparent consciousness, the Kantian 
divisions between receptivity and spontaneity, and aposteriority and apriority, would be overcome, 
and such a subject would grasp itself as part of, and its power of cognition as depending on, an 
infinite mind or reason. 
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6. A skeptical conclusion similar to Maimon's was also reached – at a slightly later historical point, 
and through reflection not on Kant but on Fichte's endeavour to complete the transcendental task – 
by the early German Romantics, who put it to more radical use than Maimon (for whom Kant's 
shortcomings direct us back, in effect, to early modern rationalist doctrines). Dieter Henrich and 
Manfred Frank have illuminated greatly the importance for Romantic post-Kantians of the notion 
that the ground of consciousness, while not properly external to it and thus in some sense lying 
within it, is necessarily inaccessible to discursive reflection.22 It lies at the root of Hölderlin's 
conception of the aesthetic as the proper mode of pursuing the task of philosophy once it has run up 
against the limits of discursivity, and of Friedrich Schlegel's elevation of irony to a position of 
philosophical supremacy, regulating our (necessarily ambivalent) attitude towards the possibility of 
a true and complete system of philosophy. 
 Most significant for our purposes, however, is Novalis' response to the Wissenschaftslehre.23 
For reasons which go back to Jacobi's thesis that an original relation to Sein, anterior to all 
judgement, must be presupposed in order for thought to have any sort of meaning, Novalis rejects 
Fichte's claim that the concept of positing is adequate to expose the absolute ground of self-
consciousness and consciousness of objects: positing involves structures of opposition and non-
identity which, Novalis supposes, we can know to be alien to being as such. The consequent 
problem of elucidating Sein prior to our (in absolute terms, defective) representation of it in 
predicative and identity statements, is handled by Novalis by means of the concept of Gefühl. 
Because Sein is free from any objectual character, its manifestation within us must be similarly non-
objectual, i.e., it must comprise a mode of consciousness which is not intentionally directed, which 
is as much as to say that it must have the character of feeling. Gefühl must however stand in some 
relation to our judgementally articulated consciousness, otherwise it would not qualify as a 
transcendental ground. Its relation to Reflexion – conceptually articulated consciousness – is that of 
content, Stoff, to Form, but these two elements do not conjoin on the relatively straightforward 
hylomorphic model of Kant's epistemology. Their relation involves what Novalis calls a principle 
of 'ordo inversus': reflection reverses the true relations obtaining within the subject, on the analogy 
with a mirror image, so that when Reflexion takes up Gefühl, the Sein which is manifest in the latter 
is lost from view, while the status of being something, a 'Was', is attributed to what has been 
conceptually formed. 
 Following a different route from Fichte, Novalis has arrived at the idea that intentional, 
propositionally articulated consciousness as such is dependent on a source which, though it cannot 
be strictly determined as the being of either the I or that of the world, does not lie outside us and 
                                                     
22 See Henrich 1992 and Frank 1997. 
23 Frank 1997, Vorlesungen 32-33. 
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comes before us in the shape of feeling, i.e. as a modification of our subjectivity, and so 
approximates to the unconscious in one of its many possible senses. But whereas Fichte supposed it 
possible to step behind the scenes of natural consciousness and reverse its inverted image of reality 
– and Maimon affirms at least the possibility of absolute cognition – Novalis relinquishes altogether 
the idea of an achieved cognitive grasp of the unconscious ground of subjectivity. Our proper 
relation to this absolute ground Novalis conceives instead as practical, but not in Kant moral sense 
– rather it takes the form of seeking 'connection with the whole', 'enlargement' 'to a whole' of the 
subject's compass.24 This might sound like Kant's account of the understanding proceeding under 
the regulative direction of reason, but what Novalis has in mind here is not the narrowly conceived 
natural scientific project of Kant but rather the Romantisierung der Welt, which subsumes enquiry 
into nature (in appropriately non-mathematical, naturphilosophisch forms). 
 In terms of our narrative, then, Novalis' innovation is to reconceive the unconscious as 
theoretically impenetrable and, for that reason, the motor of practical life. 
 
7. Fichte, Maimon, and the German Romantics agree, then, in conceiving the empirical subject as 
defined by an aporetic self-relation – empirical subjectivity is, or makes itself, possible on the 
condition that its grounds, while these yet lie in the subject itself, are not given to, or represented 
within it. Their differences concern the nature and significance of this limitation: for Kant, it is 
merely one instance among many of the general boundedness of human cognition; Fichte regards it 
as a reflection of the dual absolute/empirical structure of the I, expressed in the infinite task of 
practical reason and capable of being made philosophically transparent; Maimon considers it a 
skeptical consequence of the impossibility of completing the transcendental task in Kant's manner, 
but again as comprehensible by wissenschaftlich means; while the German Romantics treat it as 
providing the basis for a variety of aesthetic projects, in ways that lead away from philosophical 
rationalism. 
 The image of the subject as eclipsing, covering, veiling, etc., itself, is an original historical 
development.25 The notion that we are imperfect, that we fail to fully know ourselves and to realize 
completely our proper final end, is of course in no sense original: what is innovative in German 
thought is the idea that subjectivity as such comprises limited reflexivity, that the operation 
whereby we are opened up to ourselves involves also a dimension of self-occlusion. This thesis is 
maintained on an immanent basis, without any presupposed objective teleological framework, 
meaning that the purely formal concept of an incomplete self-relation has priority over any 
                                                     
24 Novalis 1795-96, Group V, no. 566, pp. 167-168 (summer 1796). Concerning the unconscious in Romantic 
aesthetics, see Görner 2010. 
25 Even if, as may plausibly be argued, the notion surfaces in some form in European thought at an earlier point – with 
Rousseau, and in early stirrings of Romanticism, such as Sturm und Drang – it remains the original achievement of 
German philosophy to have provided its explicit articulation. 
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contentful doctrine of the human being's proper ends. And this conceptual figure, though not 
articulated in these explicit terms within psychoanalytic theory, is put to work in the way that 
Freud's and post-Freudian metapsychologies picture the mind as a self-concealing structure, and 
again in the practical perspective of psychoanalytic therapy considered as an unending task of self-
retrieval. 
 
8. To conclude this part of the discussion, let me underline the point just made concerning the 
reflexive character of idealist antecedents to the concept of the unconscious, by means of a 
historical contrast. 
 The transcendental project, Henrich has claimed, is staked on the idea of constructing a 
theory of the subject in which the subject can recognize itself – the transcendental image of the 
mind should be, or correspond to, the mind's own image of itself; it specifies the conception under 
which the mind operates, deployed implicitly in order to make those operations possible.26 This 
provides one measure of validation for the theory. But as we have seen, it does not bind 
transcendental theory to representing the subject as fully self-transparent: gaps in the transcendental 
theory of the mind, under this reflexive construal, will imply regions of opacity in the subject's 
apprehension of its own grounds, and these areas of darkness will necessarily figure for it as 
belonging to the subject itself. 
 Insistence on our ignorance of the grounds of cognition is in the foreground of Fries' 
recasting of Kant's theoretical philosophy. The import of the Copernican revolution, Fries argues, is 
that cognitions are to be traced back by means of a regressive analysis to their subjective sources, 
and this enquiry must be conducted furthermore from a 'psychological' or 'anthropological' 
standpoint, meaning that it should have an exclusively a posteriori character.27 The fact that 
knowledge of the causes of our cognition is absent from natural consciousness, and awaits empirical 
investigation, represents however no reflexive deficiency: the absence is not registered subjectively 
because, in Fries' view, our pre-philosophical epistemic stance of taking on trust our basic 
convictions and immediate doxastic episodes, though deserving of philosophical elucidation, is 
unimprovable and skeptically unassailable. In this non-transcendental, naturalistic light, the subject 
needs only as much causal information concerning the generation of its mental states as may be 
required to keep belief-formation on the correct epistemic tracks; whatever else may be going on 
behind the back of consciousness belongs to the merely sub-personal and is not the subject's 'Other'. 
Fries' philosophische Anthropologie, because it does not take up the reflexive conception of Critical 
                                                     
26 This is also, significantly, the characterization applied by Richard Wollheim to Freudian theory: see in the first 
instance Wollheim 1972. 
27 See Fries 1798 and 1807. 
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philosophy, does not create space for the concept of the unconscious: it points not in the direction of 
psychoanalysis but in that of Helmholtz and later nineteenth-century psychology. 
 
II.  The Unconscious in Nineteenth-Century Thought 
 
1. The proto-psychoanalytic conception of subjectivity described in the previous section is 
transmitted through intellectual history in complex interconnection with a rich set of further 
developments originating at the very end of the eighteenth century and extending to the last decades 
of the nineteenth, in which the concept of the unconscious is for the first time formulated explicitly. 
These developments are distinguished by their commitment to a positive idealistic understanding of 
nature, which goes beyond the Kantian-Fichtean, epistemologically orientated determination of 
nature as mere appearance, by elaborating idealistic metaphysics and the theory of nature in terms 
of one another. This allows the subject, so far treated in isolation, to be set logico-genetically into a 
pre-existent order, on which basis a conception is formed of nature as existing within us in a sense 
denied by Kant and Fichte. This, in turn, facilitates the formation of new types of speculative 
hypotheses concerning the content and determinate character of human motivation. The 
unconscious figures in this development on the one hand as a way of conceiving nature itself and as 
a whole, and on the other as a way of conceiving the nature within the individual subject. 
 While we are obviously here drawing much closer to Freud, it is important to recognize that 
the historical developments viewed in their own right do not comprise a narrative of increasing 
approximation to psychoanalysis. They provided the materials, distributed over a variety of 
different figures and currents of thought, out of which Freud fashioned the psychoanalytic 
conception of the unconscious, but if we want to understand how they themselves came into 
existence then we need to grasp them in their own terms. 
 
2. The unconscious first appears by name as a technical philosophical concept in Part Three of 
Schelling's System of Transcendental Idealism, in the context of Schelling's theory of productive 
intuition.28 The theory is intended to explain how it is possible for the self qua 'absolutely 
illimitable' activity to nonetheless intuit this activity as 'intuited', Angeschautes, not as 'intuitant', 
Anschauendes, and thereby cognize itself as something limited. To resolve this contradiction, 
Schelling argues, we must posit activity which is unconscious, un-intuited. The conscious thinking 
self that stands opposed to the products of its productive intuition is in reality united with them by 
an act of the self, but this act has no intuition of itself: 'thus the acting sinks, as it were, out of 
consciousness, and only the opposition remains qua opposition therein'; the act is 'lost from 
                                                     
28 Schelling 1800: 74ff. On Schelling's concept of the unconscious, see Völmicke 2005, Ch. 4, and Bowie 2010. 
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consciousness'.29 The finitization of the self effected through unconsciousness creates a distinction 
'between what comes from without and what comes from within' and allows us to understand 'how 
the intelligence can forget itself in its products'.30 
 Thus far, Schelling may seem to have merely restated the Wissenschaftslehre in slightly 
different terms, but the next stage of his argument shows his difference from Fichte. Schelling 
claims that the activity which binds the thinking self to its products 'must also emerge in the 
product',31 leaving some trace of itself, and that it does so as force. Accordingly, under the heading 
of a 'deduction of matter',32 Schelling turns transcendental theory towards Naturphilosophie: 
gravitation, electricity, and the chemical process are each argued to correspond to a different 
component of the absolute synthesis of self-consciousness.33 The difference from Fichte, then, is 
that the different stages in the transcendental idealist genetic story which Fichte treats – at least 
some of the time, and whether or not consistently – as mere theoretical constructions, are accorded 
full reality by Schelling: earlier stages in the genetic story do not evaporate but subsist, and their 
continued existence is that of Nature in its determinate forms. The ontological ambiguity 
surrounding the status of the Wissenschaftslehre's structures of positing is thus eliminated in favour 
of a plain metaphysical realism. 
 In addition to the theoretical aim of providing a fully systematic account of the possibility of 
objectivity, Schelling is also pursuing the project, which goes back to earlier eighteenth-century 
sources such as Rousseau and Herder, of achieving freedom, and realizing the Good, through the 
recovery of a positive relation to Nature. These two elements, theoretical and practical, are tied 
together in Schelling's philosophy in a way that sets him in a direct line of descent from Spinoza 
and in opposition to Kant and Fichte: grasping our identity with the natural order, and the true 
nature thereof, holds the key on Schelling's view to a correct understanding of freedom, which is in 
turn a prerequisite of the conception of autonomy formulated (but inadequately grounded) by 
Kant.34 
 For Schelling, then, the concept of the unconscious points in two directions: as much as it, in 
Spinozistic and Freudian fashion, forces the human subject back into the natural order, so equally it 
reveals the spiritual potential of nature itself and leads to the affirmation that we stand at nature's 
                                                     
29 Schelling 1800: 77. In recovering this act, art finds its place in Schelling's system: works of art exemplify of the unity 
of conscious and unconscious factors in the constitution of reality; without their exhibition of this unity, philosophy 
cannot grasp it adequately. Marquard 1975 develops the analogy of psychoanalytic therapy with the role of art in 
Schelling's System. 
30 Schelling 1800: 74, 75. 
31 Schelling 1800: p82. 
32 Schelling 1800: 82-91. 
33 Schelling 1800: 83ff. 
34 Schelling (1800: 581-582) regards morality as dependent on nature as conceived in his Naturphilosophie, and 
declares contradictory Kant's conception of self-determination as pure self-legislation proceeding without any constraint 
or ground beyond the individual's power of reason (1804: 538-540). 
 15 
metaphysical summit; the unconscious incorporates both a moment of absorption into nature, and of 
transcendence of it. The latter is absent from Freud. 
 
3. Though Schelling postulates a dynamic unconscious with real existence, logically connected with 
Nature, the Schellingian unconscious has no specific role in psychological explanation, and 
Schelling does not ascribe an unconscious to human subjects in an individuated, particularized 
form.35 However, the conception of the individual human personality as formed out of and around a 
subsisting unconscious core evolved rapidly in Schelling's wake, in the work of followers such as 
Gotthilf Heinrich von Schubert and Ignaz Paul Vital Troxler, and in the following generation, Karl 
Gustav Carus and Gustav Theodor Fechner. On display in this phase of the theory of the 
unconscious are a host of figures of thought characteristic of the Goethezeit and Romantik, many of 
which had been formally theorized by Schelling – the concepts of polarity, of conflicts of forces and 
their generation of new products, of Nature as a single organism, along with the teleological 
recasting of Spinoza – but which are really the intellectual property of the age as a whole: the 
formalism of Schelling's Naturphilosophie merges with Herder's expressivism and Goethe's 
conception of Urphänomene,36 and themes previously explored chiefly in literary contexts, such as 
the demonic and abnormal, the sorts of phenomena on which Karl Philip Moritz's Magazin zur 
Erfahrungsseelenkunde focused with therapeutic intent, are absorbed into speculative theory. 
 The elaborate schemas of Schubert and Troxler are likely to strike us as arbitrary in their 
detail, but their ways of thinking about the mind's place in nature are readily intelligible in light of 
the basic principles of German Idealism, and they show why naturphilosophisch psychology 
necessitates a conception of the unconscious. Schubert conceives Nature as existing in historical 
form, its upward development propelled by oppositions and the necessity of their resolution, with 
man's position lying on the border separating ontological strata, on the cusp of transfiguration, 
resulting in a doubling of the self. And since the mind is not merely embedded in nature as in a 
surrounding and supporting context, rather nature holds sway within the subject, mental contents 
express the sense or meaning of Nature: the mind is able to – reflexively, but not reflectively – look 
through itself into the heart of Nature. Whence Schubert's striking conception, in his Symbolik des 
Traumes (1814), of dream, delirium and kindred states as a sui generis, pictorial mode of thinking, a 
'Hieroglyphensprache' concerned with matters beyond the bounds of the individual self.37 
                                                     
35 An unconscious mind within the individual person (of a sort) is affirmed by Schelling in his later writings (see Beach 
1994: 53-54), chiefly in connection with his metaphysical theory of the grounds of evil, but this involves a broad change 
of philosophical context and a corresponding shift in view, whereby the unconscious is associated with (positive, 
intrinsic) irrationality. For the sake of preserving a relatively linear narrative, as well as reasons of space, I am leaving 
aside the unconscious in Schelling's later philosophy (for brief discussion of which, see Beach 1994, Ch. 3). 
36 On Goethe's own involvement with the concept of the unconscious, see Nicholls 2010. 
37 Schubert 1814 [1862]: 8. 
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Reflecting the doubleness of man, we find in dreams both the Nachtseite of 'die träumende Natur in 
uns', which is associated with man's Seele, and intimations of the higher spiritual order to which 
man's Geist is directed.38 
 In Troxler's system, the structure and themes are highly similar – mental development 
conforms to a metaphysically predetermined order, of which rational conscious subjectivity 
represents only one moment, and oneiric states are cognitively privileged – but the spiritualistic 
tendency of Romantic psychology is more pronounced: man's deepest unconscious consists in his 
divinity, an ecstatic condition which may equally be described as super-consciousness. The concept 
of the unconscious here shows an ambiguity, the potential for which was present from the 
transcendental outset, and which is completely consistent with the 'union of opposites' doctrine of 
Romanticism: if the unconscious comprises, as it were, the region across which the subject's 
reflexivity fails, then it may also be taken to correspond to, or to contain implicitly, our reflexive 
completeness. Construed in this forward-looking way, the unconscious defines our telos.39  
 Notwithstanding his differences from Schelling and the more exuberantly Romantic forms 
of Naturphilosophie, Hegel's notion of the 'feeling soul', die fühlende Seele, which receives an 
extended treatment in his Encyclopaedia Philosophy of Spirit,40 also belongs in the present context. 
The concept refers, on the one hand, to a sublated moment of rational self-consciousness: the 
feeling soul comprehends the person's 'intrinsically unconscious predisposition, temperament, etc.', 
as well as everything belonging to their character (all their 'ties and essential relationships'), and it 
exists for them in the form of underlying 'merely implicit material', distinct from the unfolding play 
of their consciousness.41 But it can also exist either independently of rational subjectivity or in 
opposition to it, and in both cases we find it 'in its immediacy', in ihrer Unmittelbarkeit. The first 
case is that of the child in utero, passive and without its own individuality. The second is the 
relapsed condition displayed in dreaming and, in an extreme form, in insanity, where there emerges 
an 'actually twofold soul-life', with one side orientated towards objective reality and the other, 
broken away from it, towards the psychical, the two negatively related sides preserving awareness 
of one another.42 
 Hegel's notion of psychical regression belongs to the Ideengut of Romanticism, but his 
account of how the psychic (das Seelenhafte) distinguishes itself in pathological cases from rational 
                                                     
38 Schubert 1814 [1862]: 19-20. 
39 On Schubert, Troxler, and later figures, see Béguin 1946. On Carus and Fechner, discussion of whom I omit for 
reasons of space, see Bell 2010 and Gödde 2010. 
40 Hegel 1830/42, §§403-406; most relevant are the Zusätze to §405, pp. 90-92, and §406, pp. 98-99, and the later 
section §408. 
41 Hegel 1830/42: 90. 
42 In the Zusatz to §406, Hegel calls this, because of its independence, 'the real subjectivity of the feeling soul', as 
opposed to the 'formal subjectivity of life' exhibited in dreaming, foetal life, and ordinary rational life (Hegel 1830/42: 
98). On this topic, see Berthold-Bond 1995, Ch. 5. 
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consciousness, and of how the partition is maintained, comes closer than any of his contemporaries 
to the Kleinian conceptualization of psychic reality as an inner world. What limits Hegel, in terms 
of his degree of anticipation of Freud, is the absence of a substantial account of the causes of 
regression and partition.43 This refusal to acknowledge a quasi-autonomous substrate sponsoring 
psychic reality, is reflected in Hegel's comparison of the regressed, segregated feeling soul with 
mere states of reduced consciousness (dreaming and somnambulism). In Freud's terms, Hegel, like 
Pierre Janet, postulates only a 'second consciousness'.44 
 
4. The impetus to the Romantic naturphilosophisch development derives originally, as I indicated, 
from sources independent of transcendentalism, with which Naturphilosophie has diminished 
connection after Schelling. A relation to Kant, if not to transcendental philosophy in the strict sense, 
is however restored by Schopenhauer, whose status as a fore-runner of Freud is well recognized.45 
 Schopenhauer famously represents his system as a direct development from Kant entirely 
independent of Fichte and Schelling, but the true historical relation is certainly more complex. 
Schopenhauer's characterization of the world as Wille bears too much similarity to the Fichtean-
Schelling thesis of primordial infinite activity, for the connection to be regarded as merely 
accidental.46 But we do not need to untie the relevant knots – or to engage with the difficulties 
raised by Schopenhauer's interlacing of physiological materialist explanation with idealism – in 
order to identify the ways in which Schopenhauer steers the idealist naturphilosophisch 
development in a Freudian direction. What gives Schopenhauer's philosophy its proto-Freudian 
character is Schopenhauer's transposition of his asymmetric dualist metaphysics of Wille and 
Vorstellung into a theory of the human subject, according to which the sphere of consciousness cum 
intellect is subordinate to and in all regards expressive of an underlying conative reality. The key 
tenet that permits Schopenhauer to elaborate this picture is his thesis of the intrinsic blindness of 
Wille, i.e. of the nonsensicality of the application to it, despite its capacity to translate itself into 
objectual form, of concepts of teleology or of any other species of rational structure. When this 
general metaphysical structure is reproduced within the individual subject, it entails that the 
subject's practical reason is not just a necessarily obedient but also a necessarily unwitting slave of 
the passions: whatever I self-consciously set myself as an end cannot be (or adequately represent) 
the true motivating ground of whatever I do; to the extent that the ends at which I take myself to 
                                                     
43 This comes to the fore in Hegel's discussion of insanity in the Zusatz to §408 (Hegel 1830/42: 116-121). 
44 Freud 1915: 170. 
45 For a brief summary of the striking points of convergence, see Gardner 1999: 376-380. In more detail, see Assoun 
1976, Pt. II, Young and Brook 1994, and Janaway 2010. 
46 To make a start on this issue, we might examine Schelling's reasons (1800: 35) for rejecting the possibility that the 
self's activity is 'blind': Schopenhauer's doctrine of Wille can be understood as resulting from his own rejection of 
specific (implicit) assumptions appealed to by Schelling. 
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aim determine my actions, my having those ends, and their power to determine my actions, are 
matters which transcend my practical reason; motive force necessarily outstrips the representations 
which it conditions. The notion that subjectivity is aporetic receives here a new, very strong 
interpretation, which turns on Schopenhauer's dissociation of the concept of expression – central to 
all naturphilosophisch psychology – from the idea of rational articulation: when Wille expresses 
itself in the phenomena that it grounds, it does not thereby fulfil itself; in Hegel's terms, it does not 
in assuming objectual form achieve its truth, become actual or 'for-itself'.47 
 This account raises many questions, but one in particular is worth indicating here. The 
conative ground of the self must have an individuated character, and it must bear relations to the 
world-as-representation, if Schopenhauer's claims regarding, e.g., the psychological explanatory 
role of the sexual drive, are to make sense: if an individual's sexual desires are instrumental in 
relation to the Wille zum Leben as it is expressed in the human species, then that Wille must 
incorporate some notion, ergo some representation, of species-propagation, and this channelled, 
determinate form of Wille zum Leben must owe its existence to some more basic mode of Wille, 
which must in turn be accounted for. And yet Schopenhauer declares Wille as such – the ground of 
all determinate things – uninfected by anything ideational. Eduard von Hartmann and Nietzsche 
may be regarded as proceeding from this point. 
 
5. The problem just referred to is appealed to explicitly by Eduard von Hartmann in justification of 
the synthesis of Schopenhauer with Hegel proposed in his Philosophie des Unbewussten (1868).48 
The ideational component which is problematically absent from Schopenhauer's account of Wille is 
supplied, Hartmann argues, by Hegel's theory of the Idea, which through its marriage with the 
metaphysics of Wille finds itself protected against Schelling's criticism that the Hegelian system is 
mere 'negative philosophy' without objective reality. This might lead us to think of Hartmann's 
philosophy – since it affirms the reality of the differentiated object world but bases it on will rather 
than conceptuality – must correspond to that of late Schelling, who is indeed Hartmann's main 
source of inspiration. Hartmann's great difference from late Schelling, however, is that he abandons 
entirely Schelling's apriorism, commitment to freedom, and residual transcendental orientation, in 
favour of what he maintains is a rigorously natural-scientific foundation – hence the work's sub-
title, Speculative Resultate nach inductiv-naturwissenschaftlicher Methode. Hartmann argues that 
through inference from the data supplied by contemporary, materialist and mechanistic life science 
we can infer, first, the existence of a relative unconscious within each individuated organism, and 
                                                     
47 The full story – with Book IV taken into account – is of course more complicated, but for present purposes this 
characterization is sufficient. 
48 For a sketch of Hartmann's views, see Gardner 2010.  
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second, the ultimate unity and grounding of all relative unconsciouses in a single 'absolute' 
Unconscious, to be equated with a fusion of Schopenhauerian Wille and Hegelian Idee. 
 Hartmann's unconscious, like Schelling's, has no special connection with problems of 
human psychology; its rationale is strictly philosophical. The key to Hartmann's inference to 
unconsciousness is that manifolds of causally convergent phenomena (e.g. the various contributions 
of different bodily organs to the maintenance of a living being) are best explained by positing a 
single, end-directed cause, viz. a volition, which evidently cannot be conscious.49 Hartmann defends 
this principle of inference as a form probabilistic reasoning, but we might think it better regarded as 
a putative inference to the best explanation, and to that extent as comparable with the justification 
Freud gives for the unconscious in his 1915 paper.50 More broadly, Hartmann may be regarded as 
setting a model for Freud in the loose methodological sense of showing that a systematic theory of 
the unconscious can present itself on inductive grounds, as a hypothesis forced on us by the facts of 
experience, and so claim bona fide scientific authority. Here Hartmann's Philosophy of the 
Unconscious exhibits in grosser form the kind of historical double allegiance which, I will later 
suggest, we also find in psychoanalysis: Hartmann belongs, as it were, at both ends of the 
nineteenth century, among those convinced of the inestimable value of the legacy of German 
Idealism, and at the same time in agreement with the late nineteenth-century scientific community 
that the proper method of enquiry into nature presupposes the rejection of all idealism, vitalism and 
Naturphilosophie. 
 
6. Whereas Hartmann preserves the idealistic monism of Schopenhauer, and makes no significant 
original proposals regarding human psychology, Nietzsche's thought, considered as a development 
of Schopenhauer, does exactly the reverse, letting go the doctrine of trans-individual Wille and 
instead extending massively our conception of what sorts of psychological forces operate 
unconsciously and in what ways they condition consciousness. 
 The Freud-Nietzsche relation falls within our purview, however, only to the extent that we 
regard Nietzsche as relaying or in some way bearing on the legacy of idealism, and this raises, like 
everything in Nietzsche, thorny interpretative questions.51 What can be said with reasonable 
security is that in whatever ways we interpret Nietzsche – as a positivist, or a skeptical materialist, 
or a Lange-inspired neo-Kantian, or a metaphysician of the Will to Power – the great pieces of 
concrete psychological analysis in Nietzsche's texts, such as those in the Genealogy, are not 
presented as derived from or as presupposing any anterior philosophical commitments, and that 
                                                     
49 Hartmann gives a clear account of his methodology, aims, and relation to his predecessors in the Introduction to the 
work. 
50 See Freud 1915: 169. 
51 The relation of Freud and Nietzsche is dissected in Assoun 2000; see also Liebscher 2010. 
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Nietzsche does not attempt to extract from his analyses an organized, systematic psychological 
theory. There is in consequence nothing that can readily be called Nietzsche's model of the mind: if 
we speak of Nietzschean psychology, it is a chiefly negative matter, defined by rejection of soul-
substance, of a single referent for the I, of a power of free choice, of the autonomy of 
consciousness, etc. This results in the curious situation that Nietzsche appears to be in possession of 
all the pieces needed to construct the psychoanalytic metapsychology, and even articulates some of 
its propositions in informal and often metaphorical terms, while, as it were, declining to officially 
discover the unconscious. 
 The explanation for Nietzsche's having come to the brink of psychoanalysis but no further 
lies, plausibly, in the fundamentally practical orientation of his own project. Systematic knowledge 
of the unconscious of the sort that Freud claims to deliver – in which we fix ourselves as objects of 
knowledge and suppose that we can thereby fully and finally possess ourselves – could not assist 
and can only obstruct the radical task of self-transformation which Nietzsche believes necessary. In 
part this outlook reflects Nietzsche's criticisms of the will to truth as expressed in modern science, 
but it can also be regarded as continuous with the notion that we saw in Novalis of an essentially 
expressive – affective, aesthetic, practical – relation to the unconscious ground of our empirical 
self-conscious existence. Novalis, however, did not oppose this expressive relation to a theoretical 
relation: on the contrary, the forms of practical activity by which we relate negatively to the 
Absolute include philosophizing and all manner of encyclopaedic cognitive pursuits. Nietzsche 
rejects this harmony of theoretical and practical reason: in The Birth of Tragedy, the Dionysian is 
opposed to the Socratic, and in later works there is no real restoration of reflective practice.52 
 In terms of his relation to the legacy of idealism, then, what should be said to be exemplified 
by Nietzsche's treatment of the concept of the unconscious is his conviction – after his abandonment 
of The Birth of Tragedy's attempt to employ idealist concepts in a fictionalist spirit – that the 
practical-axiological aims which, Nietzsche understood well, drive German Idealism, are not 
furthered but frustrated by it. 
 
III.  The Conceptual Problems of Psychoanalysis as Attesting to the Idealist Legacy 
 
1. Classical German philosophy plays, I have suggested, a formative role in relation to 
psychoanalysis at several levels: in the provision of the basic conception, formulated in the earliest 
phase of post-Kantianism, of the subject as constituted by incomplete reflexivity; in the conception 
of the subject as rooted in and expressive of nature, developed in Romantic, naturphilosophisch 
                                                     
52 Nietzsche's practicalism also helps to explain the very considerable differences between Freud and Nietzsche at the 
level of substantive psychological claims: Nietzsche's conclusions are different, because his psychological enquiry is 
dominated by a specific set of explananda, determined by his agenda of morality critique. 
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strands of post-Kantian idealism; and in more concrete speculative claims concerning the content 
and character of human motivation, advanced by Schopenhauer and pursued by Nietzsche. 
 But we should also take stock of what has been discarded, and the most obvious, 
fundamental change is the naturalization of Nature – the movement in the course of the nineteenth 
century towards progressively more austere, 'disenchanted', views of the fabric of the natural order, 
the triumph of which is reflected in Freud's Entwurf. In this section I argue that we can see in 
psychoanalysis, alongside surviving idealist elements, the consequences of its renunciation of the 
full metaphysical commitments of idealism. These show themselves in the conceptual problems that 
philosophical scrutiny of psychoanalytic theory brings to light. 
 
2. The heart of the issue is identified in these comments of Sartre's: 
 
By the distinction between the 'id' and the 'ego', Freud has cut the psychic whole into two. I 
am the ego but I am not the id. I hold no privileged position in relation to my unconscious 
psyche. I am my own psychic phenomena in so far as I establish them in their conscious 
reality [...] But I am not those psychic facts, in so far as I receive them passively and am 
obliged to resort to hypotheses about their origin and true meaning [...] I can know myself 
only through the mediation of the other, which means that I stand in relation to my 'id', in 
the position of the Other.53 
 
Sartre considers this conceptual situation paradoxical – and goes on to argue, in his famous 
criticism of Freud's hypothesis of a censor mechanism responsible for repression, resistance and 
other putative interactions between Cs. and Ucs., that psychoanalytic explanations are either 
contradictory or empty.54 The nub of that argument is that Freud, having on the one hand declared 
that the id, or Ucs, is properly conceptualized as not-I, is on the other hand obliged to treat it as 
having all of the features that define I-hood. The inconsistency is concealed through verbal means – 
the systematic ambiguity of psychoanalysis' theoretical terms. 
 Rather than examine the censor mechanism argument, I want to maintain focus on the issue 
identified by Sartre, concerning what Freud does with the 'I'. 
 Sartre is not denying that there is something extremely puzzling in the psychological 
phenomena which comprise the core explananda of psychoanalysis. The explananda are genuine, 
not a product of psychological theory; in Sartre's own language, they comprise the conduites of the 
for-itself in bad faith.55 Sartre's complaint is that psychoanalytic theory loses sight of the problem 
                                                     
53 Sartre 1943: 50-51. 
54 Sartre 1943: 53-54. 
55 It takes many forms. Repression, resistance, etc., exemplify a relatively complex puzzle arising from the subject's 
reflexive counter-purposiveness. St Augustine articulates a closely associated but much simpler puzzle: 'Although it is 
part of my nature, I cannot understand all that I am. This means, then, that the mind is too narrow to contain itself 
entirely. But where is that part of it which it does not itself contain? Is it somewhere outside itself and not within it? 
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which they confront us with: what it offers as a solution implies directly that what seemed to be the 
problem (viz., how can a subject lie to itself, work against its own purposes, etc.?) was in truth just 
another causal process (the mere mechanical interaction of elements within the psychic aggregate). 
To draw a relevant comparison: If the problem of self-consciousness is solved simply by postulating 
representations of representations, then there is no real problem to begin with; the reflexivity of 
self-consciousness presents a problem, only if it can not be analyzed in that fashion. 
 This takes us to a second statement of the problem, by Ernst Tugendhat, which again hits the 
nail on the head, and does so with sensitivity to the complexity of the issues involved: 
 
[...] it is striking that Freud not only does not refer to the ordinary way of talking about the 'I' 
but also does not even speak of a relation of oneself to oneself. The 'ego' is an objective power 
within the psychical reality, just like the 'id' and the 'superego'; the only difference is that in 
contrast to the latter it is an 'organisation' and has a synthetic function [...] Since Freud grasps 
not only (like Plato) sensuality and normative consciousness but also what he calls the ego as 
an objective power, the ego is reduced to an anonymous organization with an integrative 
function. In so doing he discards precisely that aspect which was the basis for the orientation 
toward the expression I: the relation of oneself to oneself. Since Freud simply left this aspect 
out of consideration, he avoided the structural absurdities that result if one is intent upon 
understanding the relation of oneself to oneself in accordance with the traditional model of the 
subject-object relation. Hence, Freud's own theory of the ego has the advantage of not 
containing absurdities, and it has only the disadvantage that it is in no sense a theory of the 
relation of oneself to oneself. But such a theory would have to follow from his own 
assumptions as soon as one attempted to translate the substantives id, ego, and superego into 
terms that are behaviourally relevant, that is, as soon as one specifies the modes of being of 
the person for which the substantives stand. In the case of the term ego this would mean 
examining the relation of the person to himself, and without a concept of the relationship of 
oneself to oneself it does not appear possible to understand something like self-
determination.56 
 
Tugendhat makes the point, of which we do indeed need to be reminded when our attention is fixed 
on German Idealism, that philosophical elucidation of self-consciousness was not on Freud's agenda 
and is nowhere claimed by Freud to be furnished by psychoanalytic theory. But, as Tugendhat 
indicates, this does not absolve Freud. Precisely because Freud does not address the issue, it is easy 
to suppose – and quite probably Freud did suppose; so Sartre assumes at any rate – that the 
psychoanalytic theory of the ego, from which all of the conceptual obscurities of Kant, Fichte and 
Schelling's treatments of the topic are blissfully absent, tacitly solves the problem of self-
consciousness. And this, as Tugendhat indicates, would be a mistake: Freud cannot duck the 
question of 'the relation of oneself to oneself', because psychoanalytic attributions need to be 
                                                                                                                                                                                
How, then, can it be part of it, if it is not contained within it? I am lost in wonder when I consider this problem. It 
bewilders me.' (Confessions, 10.8). 
56 Tugendhat 1986: 131-132. 
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translated into 'terms that are behaviourally relevant', i.e. grasped as 'modes of being of the 
person'.57 
 Essentially the same point is made from the opposite quarter, that of those who think that 
self-relations and modes of being of the person do not provide good philosophical currency. 
Michael Moore writes: 
 
Freud's metapsychology and its theoretical unconscious is caught in a dilemma: the 
mentalistic vocabulary of persons in terms of which clinicians prompt patients to recapture 
unconscious wishes and so on is not a vocabulary in which it makes sense to construct a 
deep theory such as the metapsychology purports to be [...] the metapsychology should be 
seen as an exercise in homuncular functionalism [...] To construe the metapsychology as an 
exercise in homuncular functionalism provides a plausible enough insulation of the theory 
from any metaphysical embarrassment.58 
 
 The point at issue is helpfully formulated by employing the personal/sub-personal 
distinction, which I introduced earlier in distinguishing the (psychoanalytic) unconscious from the 
merely non-conscious. In those terms, psychoanalysis is a kind of theoretical duck-rabbit, founded 
on a systematic confusion of the personal and sub-personal levels. This is what enables the sleight 
of hand which Sartre thinks can be found in all psychoanalytic explanation: psychoanalysis is 
premised on a conceptual move from the level of the person as a whole to the sub-personal level, 
but it ends up re-importing the personal level at the sub-personal, in its account of the actions of the 
sub-personal modules. Moore's proposal is that the confusion be resolved once and for all by an all-
out, explicit, rigorous sub-personalization. 
 There is a very great deal more to be said about all of this,59 but for present purposes the 
issue can be said to come down to the following: Psychoanalysis leaves us unable to truly 
understand how its talk of mental parts and unconscious processes, the bits and pieces which 
compose its map of the mind, is to be coordinated with our reflexive understanding, which it 
actively draws on, of ourselves as self-conscious self-determining subjects. The problem arises 
because its mereological analysis is cast in the terms of modern, post-idealistic naturalism, and 
those terms, which foreswear the (teleological, dialectical, etc.) conceptual forms of idealism, are 
too spare to allow us to grasp the sum of mental parts as forming the kind of whole with which 
ordinary self-consciousness presents us. And this situation has a historical explanation: 
                                                     
57 Düsing (1997: 36-39) puts the point well: though Freud does not address the philosophical problem of self-
consciousness, his structural theory is an implicit criticism (continuous with that of Ernst Mach) of classical theories of 
the self. 
58 Moore 1988: 148, 154, 156. There are many versions of the cognitive psychological approach to psychoanalysis: see, 
e.g., Boden 1977, Erdelyi 1985, and Kitcher 1992. Kitcher's study (1992) is primarily historical and so has particular 
relevance to the present context. Kitcher's reservations about psychoanalysis concern the prematurity of the naturalistic, 
sub-personal interdisciplinary synthesis which she regards it as attempting. 
59 I explore this issue at greater length in Gardner 2000. 
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psychoanalysis retrieves from idealism a conceptual form, which provides it with its foundation, but 
not its accompanying conceptual context. 
 
3. The result is that psychoanalysis in toto incorporates more commitments than can be synthesized 
without readopting an idealistic Romantic standpoint. This is reflected in the quite extraordinary 
diversity of (mutually antagonistic) forms of psychoanalytic thought, which range from those who 
think that psychoanalytic traffics in the species of narrative truth appropriate to edifying literary 
fictions, to the view that psychoanalytic explanations are meaningless unless they are taken to have 
neural referents supplying them with a possibility in principle of verification.60 The extent and 
depth of the disagreements which separate different schools of psychoanalysis, and the palpable 
difficulty of finding any moderately determinate set of Freudian claims endorsed by a significant 
sub-set of positions, make it reasonable to doubt the unity of the discipline or the existence of any 
single research project; we do better, it may be suggested, to reserve the term psychoanalysis for 
those that stick reasonably close to Freudian orthodoxy and to concoct a different heading – 
'dynamic psychotherapy', e.g. – for the plethora of forms of thought and clinical practice which 
stand in some or other line of descent from Freud. Issues of taxonomy and terminology aside, the 
important point for our purposes is that the fracturing and pluralization of post-Freudian theory has 
a firm conceptual root in Freud's original conception of psychoanalysis, and that Freud's conception 
of psychoanalysis an all-embracing theoretical unity was no arbitrary projection: Freud was exactly 
right to suppose that, if all of the commitments of late modernity are to be honoured – its 
Kantianism as well as its naturalism – then an intellectual structure along the lines of 
psychoanalysis is necessary. The ambitious aim of supplying a comprehensive theory of man 
remains hard to shake off: it is reflected in the way that different schools of psychoanalytic thought 
fail to cohabit peaceably, while repeated attempts to synthesize their different theoretical 
perspectives fail to gain acceptance. 
 
4. Two further, corroborative implications of psychoanalysis' abandonment of idealism are worth 
noting. 
 The teleologically structured Nature of idealism and Romanticism is permeated with 
normativity. When the unconscious is located within Nature so conceived, it too has direct 
normative import. Given the origin of the unconscious in the theoretical concerns of 
transcendentalism, this is just what should be expected. Even anti-rationalist Romanticism – 
Nietzsche in The Birth of Tragedy – grants the unconscious normative authority (the Dionysian is 
the source, or at least the principal necessary condition, of the Good). 
                                                     
60 For a basic survey of developments, see Gedo 1999. 
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 The ethics of psychoanalysis are a complex topic, and there are many ways in which, it has 
been argued, values can be extracted from (or located in) psychoanalysis, but it can be said with 
confidence that there is no similarly direct, conceptually transparent route from psychoanalytic 
explanations to practical norms. The emancipatory value of psychoanalysis, and its potential for 
serving purposes of social critique, exploit this value-freedom. Thus, whereas idealism guarantees 
the unconscious a positive role in sustaining personal autonomy, the implications of psychoanalysis 
for human autonomy are much less clear – indeed, are hotly disputed – despite the fact that 
psychoanalysis is presented by Freud as a major further step in the unfinished project of 
Enlightenment. 
 The second implication is connected closely with the first. When Nature is conceived 
idealistically, our personal identities can be allowed to merge with larger, impersonal objects, 
without being eroded: under the conditions of idealism, grasping ourselves as individuals is 
consistent with knowing ourselves to be parts of non-personal wholes, in which we can furthermore 
consider ourselves at home. The relation of the human subject to (the rest of) nature implied by 
psychoanalysis is starker and more alienated. The instinct theory which lies at the foundation of 
Freud's metapsychology requires us to recognize forces of nature at the foundation of our 
personalities, but the conceptual means provided by Romantic idealism for grasping these as 
continuous with rational subjectivity have been eliminated, making the relation of personality to 
instinctual force a confrontation with something antithetic to personality. Psychoanalysis requires us 
to avow the nature within us, but this nature, in its post-idealistic conception, is too much like 
nature outside us for avowal to be really intelligible. Again, Sartre's insight that the conceptual 
demands of psychoanalysis are incongruent with subjective understanding, 'being-for-itself', proves 
well-founded, and again a historical explanation is available. 
 
5. Post-Freudian psychoanalytic theory, I said, wrestles with the problems generated by Freud's 
grafting of materialist and mechanistic forms of explanation onto an idealist conception of 
subjectivity.61 A comprehensive review of these developments is impossible here, but I want to cite 
one which seems to me an especially clear illustration of the pressures operating within 
psychoanalytic thought. 
 The concept of sublimation occupies a crucial but uneasy place in the psychoanalytic 
edifice. It is, on the one hand, the concept which has the job of providing for the full transition from 
animality to the realm of art and culture, in short, to all that we value for its own sake and consider 
'highest' in humanity's collective achievements. The difficulty, however, is that Freud's account of 
                                                     
61 Their focus has been in particular on Freud's theory of instinct or drive, Trieb, regarded as the node of transition from 
the somatic to the psychological. 
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this psychical function is extremely bare, so much so that the suspicion reasonably forms that 
sublimation is a mere dummy concept employed when contentful psychoanalytic explanation grinds 
to a halt in the face of mental phenomena whose richness and complexity it cannot do justice to. 
 A remarkable attempt to resolve this problem is made in Hans Loewald's short book, 
Sublimation. What is most striking in Loewald's proposals – when viewed in light of the historical 
perspective we have been exploring – is the degree to which Loewald resorts to conceptual figures 
which manifestly bear the stamp of German idealism and Naturphilosophie. The conception of 
sublimation which Freud originally elaborated assumes a conception of the ego defined by the 
function of defence, and identifies sublimation as a transformation of (sexual) instinct cued by 
inhibition of the original instinctual aim, for which sublimation offers a substitute. Loewald very 
plausibly considers this inadequate to grasp the specific nature of the non-quantitative 
transformation involved in the sorts of phenomena which sublimation is held to be responsible for. 
Accordingly, following Winnicott, Loewald detaches the concept of instinct from that of discharge 
or diminution of excitation, thereby allowing instincts aims that transcend the mechanistic law of 
tension reduction which, according to Freud, rules the psychic apparatus.62 Sublimatory instincts 
are, according to Loewald, directed towards 'restoration of unity ... a differentiated unity (a 
manifold) that captures separateness in the act of uniting, and unity in the act of separating',63 
'reconciliation of the subject-object dichotomy'.64 Their field of operation, the objects over which 
they range, is furthermore conceived as intra-psychic. 
 My observation is simply that this overhauling of Freudian theory, designed to give it an 
explanatory grip on the vast field of human experience in which things are taken as valuable per se 
rather than as mere means to pleasure, appears to involve a complete shift of framework. If Loewald 
is right that it is necessary to postulate an irreducible, autonomous reflexive drive whose aim 
encompasses value – 'the value of the ego itself as a higher form of psychic organization'65 – in 
order to theorize the mental lives of rational subjects, then Naturphilosophie and idealism are 
vindicated: at the base of human subjectivity lies a Bildungstrieb.66 And this is in effect the very 
lesson drawn by Loewald: psychoanalysis refers us, he says in his conclusion, to a natura naturans 
characterized by a subjectivity vaster than 'human individual mentation'.67 
                                                     
62 Loewald 1988, Ch. 2. 
63 Loewald 1988: 24. 
64 Loewald 1988: 20. 
65 Loewald 1988: 42. 
66 Loewald maintains a close relation between the higher products of sublimation and their lower corporeal prototypes 
(1988: 13-14, 33-34), but it is hard to understand how, without a naturphilosophisch context, it can be more than 
contingent. The (re)turn of psychoanalytic theory to Naturphilosophie is a rare occurrence, but Ferenczi's Thalassa 
(1924) provides an early precedent. 
67 Loewald 1988: 79-80. More precisely, Loewald considers that this metaphysics coheres with his construal of 
psychoanalysis, and it is not clear whether he would accept that it is also required by it, as I am urging. Some writing on 
psychoanalysis does explore the connection with the idealist legacy. Marquard's view is referred to above. Hopkins 
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6. It might be objected that, contrary to what I may seem to have been assuming, the conceptual 
problems of psychoanalysis which I have been discussing do in fact have solutions. Certainly the 
cursory overview which I have offered here does not show them to be insoluble. However, the 
limited, historically diagnostic claim which I have made does not presuppose their insolubility.  
only that psychoanalysis exhibit a pattern of tensions. In fact, as regards the non-historical, 
systematic question, it seems to me likely that, so long as we allow ourselves a sufficiently relaxed 
scheme of psychological explanation – which helps itself to the notion of mental partition, and to 
the idea that essentially different types of mental operation can interact coherently within the 
subject – the tensions can be removed, at least to the extent that it can be shown that psychoanalysis 
is at no significant disadvantage in comparison with common sense or 'folk' psychology, from 
which, indeed, its forms of explanation are borrowed, allowing us to describe psychoanalysis as an 
extension of common sense psychology.68 
 This, however, raises a further question: Is common sense psychology itself free of the sort 
of conceptual problems which afflict psychoanalysis? For some time now, eliminativists in the 
philosophy of mind have been arguing that intentional psychology, or at any rate the particular 
version of it operating in 'folk' psychology, is incoherent. If this assessment is justified, then the 
argument that psychoanalysis comprises an extension of common sense psychology merely passes 
the buck, and conceptual problems in psychoanalysis should be regarded as exposing concealed 
lines of fault in our ordinary conceptual scheme. This is, in fact, exactly the strategy that Sartre is 
pursuing, with the aim of purifying our conception of psychological explanation by showing the 
need for expulsion of its naturalistic elements, in a way that recalls Fichte's demand that we 
expunge from our self-conception all traces of 'dogmatism': Sartre's criticism of Freud is, in effect, 
that psychoanalysis has abetted the naturalistic degradation of the subject from its correct idealist 
conception. 
 The account which I have given of psychoanalysis comprises what is sometimes called a 
humanistic view, according to which the project of psychoanalysis and that of empirical 
psychology, however much their paths may cross, are fundamentally distinct. The recurrent 
preoccupation with psychoanalysis on the part of philosophers who lack any interest in empirical 
psychology as such shows that this is not a marginal view: Sartre provides one example, but 
                                                                                                                                                                                
1987 and Wollheim 1993 draw parallels of psychoanalytic concepts with those of idealism. Several Hegelian 
reconstructions of psychoanalytic thought have been proposed, however: see Opatow 1989, Berthold-Bond 1995, 
Snelling 2001, Mills 2002, and Ver Eecke 2006. The view that psychoanalytic thought requires an injection of non-
naturalistic philosophy is evidenced also by Binswanger's attempt to reconstrue psychoanalysis as Daseinanalysis. 
68 This argument is developed in Gardner 1993. There are several versions of the extension view, the original 
formulation of which is due to Richard Wollheim and James Hopkins. Cavell 1993 argues that psychoanalysis can be 
freed from its conceptual difficulties through the adoption of a Davidsonian construal of the ordinary conception of 
mind and meaning. For a different account, see Lear 1990 and 2005. 
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numerous others may be cited, from Adorno, Horkheimer, and Habermas, to (post-)analytic 
contemporaries such as Richard Wollheim, Donald Davidson, and Jonathan Lear. It is therefore a 
safe conclusion that psychoanalysis contains elements that, at the very least, invite a non-
naturalistic construal, and it is these that I have argued may be traced back to German idealism. 
 But it is equally an implication of what I have argued that psychoanalysis lends itself also to 
naturalistic construals, which have sound motivation: if psychoanalysis is conceptually problematic 
in the ways suggested, and if those conceptual problems are reflections of its idealist antecedents, 
then one way to solve its problems is to cut psychoanalysis fully loose from its non-naturalistic 
historical sources (this is the force of Moore's recommendation, which we saw above). 
Notwithstanding the long tradition within the philosophy of science repudiating Freud's claim that 
psychoanalysis meets the conditions of empirical knowledge,69 striking attempts have been made, as 
noted above, to rationalize psychoanalysis by means of its thorough naturalization.70 Whether the 
future of psychoanalysis lies in its unification with brain science, evolutionary theory, and cognitive 
psychology is a systematic question which lies outside the scope of the present discussion. The 
historical story, however, gives reason to wonder whether sloughing off the legacy of idealism 
would leave behind anything recognizably psychoanalytic. 
 
                                                     
69 Beginning with Popper, but at greatest length in Grünbaum 1984. 
70 A huge number of chiefly North American psychoanalytic theorists might be cited here. Benjamin Rubinstein has 
been an especially influential proponent of the view that psychoanalysis should reconceive itself as 
'protoneurophysiology'. 
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